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ABSTRACT  
The advancements in the power grid due to integration of new technology arises concerns 
regarding its reliability in terms of performance and security. On one hand, the gradual shift 
towards renewable energy sources leads to rise in uncertainty in terms of control and demand 
satisfaction. On the other hand, the integration of communication devices in order to make the grid 
smart increases its vulnerability to malicious activity. Automatic Generation Control (AGC), 
which is needed to maintain the system frequency and inter-area exchange, has an important 
priority in both the concerns. With rising shares of renewables and retiring of fossil-fuel based 
generation, a grid almost entirely served by renewables is a highly possible scenario. In such cases, 
the impact of an attack on the grid is likely to be influenced by the effect of renewables. Although 
previous research conducted crucial studies of malicious cyber events on the power grid, analysis 
in the presence of renewables is still at a nascent stage. As a contribution, this thesis presents an 
attack-defense analysis on the AGC operation of the power grid under varying conditions of 
renewables. It has two main contributions – determination of the influence of renewables during 
an attack and development of an effective algorithm for defense. 
First, this thesis discusses a cyber-attack on the AGC algorithm with various levels of 
renewable penetration, to analyze the effect of an attack with renewables. The results confirm that 
the impact of a cyber-attack will be increasingly aggravated by displacement of conventional 
generation with renewables. Then an algorithm for AGC using a PID based approach aimed at 
reducing the impact is proposed.  From the experiments, the proposed algorithm is shown to reduce 
the impact of the attack. Secondly, an algorithm for attack mitigation is designed and its 
performance is analyzed for both the AGC algorithms. The various factors tested are its 
effectiveness in reducing the impact on the system, and its adverse effects on AGC operation 
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during normal conditions and contingency response. The results show that the algorithm could 
mitigate the attack without having a negative impact on normal AGC operation. The contingency 
response analysis shows that during events resulting in a significant change in generation-load 
balance, the response could be adversely affected by the mitigation. The experiments were 
conducted using the Power Cyber CPS security testbed at Iowa State University. 
The thesis further briefly discusses the prospective research considering various 
developments in the power grid, renewables and attack vectors. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The smart grid consisting of complex power network and more complex communication 
network faces increasing challenges in reliability, security and stability with its growth. As the 
shift to sustainable energy sources is on the rise, the reliability of stable power delivery becomes 
more fragile [8]. The need for superior control methods in order to counter the effects of 
uncertainty and instability introduced by the renewable sources is evident. An even greater 
problem is the growing threat of malicious activity in cyber-space. With the push towards making 
the grid smarter, critical industrial control systems (ICS) such as the power grid have become as 
vulnerable to cyber threats, as their counterparts in information technology such as banking, share 
markets, service sectors, etc. This is further undermined by the retention of legacy equipment in 
order to optimize costs and complexity faced during the transformation. With increasing 
interdependence between the physical and cyber networks [32], the impact of any attack can be 
astronomical. The December 2015 attack on the Ukrainian power grid which affected thousands 
is one of the most sophisticated attack on the power grid [34]. The ability of the attackers in 
performing long-term reconnaissance operations to learn about the system and a highly 
synchronized attack, served as an eye opener and as quoted, “a wakeup call” in coming to terms 
with the fact that these events are far from being merely an unpleasant hypothesis. 
SCADA Overview 
The smart grid is one of the largest and most complex systems made, that spreads over 
large geographical areas and comprising of the traditional physical system to provide the basic 
functionality, and the cyber network for support in control and management. Figure 1.1 shows the 
layout of the smart grid. The physical layer consists of the power system which includes the 
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generation, transmission, distribution systems, and equipment for measurement, protection, etc. 
The communication layer includes the control center and substation Remote Terminal Units 
(RTU), devices such as phasor measurement units (PMU) which are directly connected to the 
communication layer, smart meters, etc. 
 
Figure 1.1 Smart grid layout 
Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) operations, viz., State 
Estimation (SE), Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) and Automatic Generation Control (AGC) are 
the most crucial tasks that help in maintaining stability, adequacy and security [30]. 
Wide Area Monitoring (WAM) is performed by SE and is used to obtain values of the 
critical system parameters or states used to analyze system stability. Wide Area Protection (WAP) 
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is used to help restore the system stability during any abnormal events such as faults, overloads, 
etc. One of the methods is Special Protection Scheme (SPS) or RAS which detects unhealthy 
system conditions and performs the necessary action to prevent the situation from aggravating. 
Wide Area Control (WAC) is accomplished using Automatic Generation Control (AGC) that helps 
maintain the system frequency, load balance and inter-area exchange using control loops. 
The signals necessary for these operations are transmitted through the cloud and are thus 
vulnerable to malicious activity that can adversely affect the grid. The following sections describe 
the current scenario and briefly depict the previous work that has been done in the respective areas. 
Cyber Security of Smart Grids 
Although the WAMPAC applications operate with the objective of maintaining the power 
grid stability, they are traditionally unequipped to deal with cyber threats. With increasing devices 
connected to the cyber layer and complexity of system operations, the risk posed by cyber-attacks 
has reached alarming levels. The retention of legacy equipment while conversion to smart system 
poses a serious threat. Power grids were previously connected using traditional communication 
devices. While conversion to smart systems, these devices are directly connected to the internet 
without sufficient secure equipment, so as to avoid costs and inconvenience. This leaves the smart 
grid with a lot of vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks. The lack of compatibility of traditional IT 
security measures to address the security needs of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) is also an issue.  
There is a growing spike in attacks in cyberspace over the past years. Malware based 
attacks, like Stuxnet that corrupted the ICS of nuclear fuel enrichment equipment, are being widely 
used repeatedly in several applications. The attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in 2015 and 2016 
were the first major attacks on a power grid and affected more than 200,000 customers. Hence, 
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research in this area to identify potential attacks and development of effective security measures 
is of crucial importance. 
There has been extensive research in analyzing attacks and impacts on WAMPAC 
operations. Aditya et.al. present an implementation of a successful data integrity attack on AGC 
operation on the Power-cyber testbed at Iowa State University [9]. Siddharth et.al. provide a 
descriptive analysis for various attacks on AGC operation, and also provide an effective mitigation 
algorithm employing a model based anomaly detection that uses real time load forecast [10]. 
Siddharth et.al in [11] describes attack models for integrity and DoS attacks, and develops 
templates for attack on AGC. Aditya et.al. in [12] present an attack defense analysis by conducting 
stealthy attacks on AGC and a mitigation using model based anomaly detection techniques. In 
[13], Aditya et.al discuss about attack resilient architecture for WAMPAC by developing a detailed 
framework that addresses the entire security cycle of risk assessment, attack prevention, detection, 
mitigation and resilience. They also provide a defense-in-depth architecture that elaborates 
security at both infrastructure and application layers, and discuss various issues faced in 
implementing security measures. Tan et.al. in [14] discuss an optimal approach towards 
developing an attack vector on AGC by analyzing the impacts on the system due to several attacks 
based on captured sensor measurements and system data. Siddharth in [31] presents an in-depth 
study on risk modeling and analysis for coordinated attacks, and provide an online mitigation 
strategy using heuristics based contingency analysis and attack resilient control using real time 
load forecasts. In [33] Vivek et.al. discuss an approach to stealthy cyber-attacks on RAS operation 
of a power grid using a coordinated attack involving malware based system corruption and 
modification of signals, considering multiple values of the attack parameter. 
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Integration of Renewable Energy Sources 
One of the biggest revolutions in the power grid is the shift towards renewable energy 
sources, wind and solar being the major share. There is a global trend towards conversion to cleaner 
and sustainable energy sources. Most nations have renewables up to at least 10% of their total 
capacity. Some of the driving factors for this shift include [36]: 
1. Environmental impact of fossil fuel based generation. 
2. Depleting fossil fuel reserves. 
3. Low operational costs. 
4. Growing energy demand. 
5. Ability to electrify remote locations without dependence on the transmission network. 
 
Figure 1.2 Incremental global renewables-based electricity generation relative to 2009 by technology 
(Figure from [36]) 
The graph in Figure 1.2 shows the expected increase in generation capacity for each 
technology over the next two decades. It is evident that in the future nearly half of the added 
capacity will be renewable based generation. Also, considering that many nations are planning to 
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retire fossil fuel based power plants, a power grid that is served almost entirely by renewable 
generation is not an unexpected scenario. 
 
Figure 1.3 Expected global renewable generation (Figure from [36]) 
From the graph in Figure 1.3, that shows the expected growth in energy generation by 
renewables, it can be inferred that net generation by renewables is predicted to double within the 
next two decades. However, these changes arise serious concerns about reliability. The 
unpredictable nature of renewable sources is a major contributor to the instability in the power 
grid. With its rapid inﬂux, there is a crucial need for efﬁcient load frequency control. Although the 
impact of renewables on the power grid has not been completely assessed, studies have generated 
numerous important findings as given below: 
1. Partial unpredictability or uncertainty due to limitations in forecast. 
2. Fluctuating output power or variability due to varying wind and solar input, leading to 
frequency fluctuations. 
3. The above property has led to decline in control performance metrics such as CPS1. 
4. Reduction in system inertia causing faster frequency response and increased Rate of 
Change of Frequency (ROCOF). 
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A detailed description of the factors to be considered while integrating significant content 
of renewables is provide in [4]. This thesis considers two of the factor discussed in [4] - inertia and 
regulation. 
There has been significant research in the direction of reliability and real-time markets in 
the presence of renewables. There is widespread study in this area with debates on various 
techniques. Multiple methods have been suggested as alternatives to the conventional AGC with 
or without considering renewables. Arman et.al in [15] present a hierarchical control architecture 
that includes market mechanisms, economic dispatch and frequency regulation for a system with 
uncertain load and generation. Zhang et.al propose a consensus based controller approach to AGC 
using distributed load side frequency regulators with the impact of renewables on the system 
frequency [16]. Keyhani et.al. developed an alternative to expensive spinning reserves used for 
integration with renewable sources using a three-step method involving addressing load 
fluctuations, calculating accurate set points for generators, and fast cyber communication for 
monitoring and control [17]. In [18] Gauthier et.al. discuss a dynamic frequency control system 
for isolated grids using fast acting energy storage units to provide inertial response and improve 
transient performance. Moslehi et.al in [21] describes the existing scenario for smart grids 
elaborating on the challenges faced in reliability and security due to trend towards renewables, 
while weighing on the need for protective measures and analyzing their technical feasibilities. 
Another grave concern is the effect of the presence of renewable in the event of a cyber-
attack. This is an area that has seen very useful, although limited exploration. In [19] Ayar et.al 
propose a nonlinear distributed controller that improves transient stability margins of synchronous 
generators by means of distributed storage systems, that helps during disturbances caused due to 
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cyber-attacks, while also considering resilience to time delays that are introduced during 
communication. Giovanna et.al. conducts a cyber risk assessment study and suitable mitigation by 
means of security measures, on the voltage regulation of medium voltage equipment that connect 
Distributed Energy Resources (DER) to the rest of the grid, in [22]. Moness et.al presents an 
overview of Internet of Energy (IoE) and next generation Wind Energy Control Systems (WECS) 
while considering the challenges of integration and concerns about cyber security in [27]. 
Table 1.1 SCADA advancements in the power grid 
Publication title 
Topic addressed 
Cyber 
security 
WAMPAC 
application 
Renewable 
integration 
Experimental evaluation of cyber-attacks on 
automatic generation control using a cps security 
testbed. 
✓ ✓  
Model-based attack detection and mitigation for 
automatic generation control. 
✓ ✓  
Data Integrity Attacks and their Impacts on SCADA 
Control System. 
✓ ✓  
Testbed-based performance evaluation of Attack 
Resilient Control for AGC. 
✓ ✓  
Cyber-Physical Attack-Resilient Wide-Area 
Monitoring, Protection, and Control for the Power 
Grid. 
✓ ✓  
Optimal False Data Injection Attack against 
Automatic Generation Control in Power Grids. 
✓ ✓  
A Hierarchical Transactive Control Architecture for 
Renewables Integration in Smart Grids: Analytical 
Modeling and Stability. 
 ✓ ✓ 
Distributed Load-Side Frequency Regulation for 
Power System. 
 ✓ ✓ 
A New Automatic Generation Control with 
Heterogeneous Assets for Integration of 
Renewables. 
 ✓ ✓ 
Dynamic Frequency Control Support by Energy 
Storage to Reduce the Impact of Wind and Solar 
Generation on Isolated Power Systems Inertia. 
 ✓ ✓ 
A Distributed Control Approach for Enhancing 
Smart Grid Transient Stability and Resilience. 
✓  ✓ 
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Table 1.1 (continued)  
A reliability perspective of the smart grid ✓  ✓ 
Impact of DER integration on the cyber security 
of SCADA systems—The medium voltage 
regulation case study 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
A Survey of Cyber-Physical Advances and 
Challenges of Wind Energy Conversion Systems: 
Prospects for Internet of Energy 
✓  ✓ 
Stealthy cyber-attacks and impact analysis on wide-
area protection of smart grid 
✓ ✓  
From Table 1.1, it can be seen that despite all these valuable contributions, there is a 
scarcity of research on the attack-defense analysis of any WAMPAC applications in the presence 
of renewable energy sources. This thesis aims to bridge the gap by conducting an attack defense 
study on the AGC operation of the smart grids with renewables integrated. 
Thesis Motivation 
The importance of security for the smart grid has rapidly gained a foundation over the past 
few years, especially with the recent attacks on the Ukrainian power grid in 2015 and 2016. 
Although information technology (IT) security has often been reliable, it is not always suitable for 
cyber security of ICS. This is due to the security priorities of the system data, i.e. in IT security 
Confidentiality is the most critical property, while in ICS security, Availability takes a higher 
importance. This arises the need to develop security features that go beyond the realms of 
traditional cyber security onto cyber physical security, where the physical characteristics of the 
system must be taken as essential factors. The changing nature of the grid involving increasing 
renewable is also an important detail to be analyzed. The study on cyber-attacks on power grid 
operations such as AGC in the presence of renewables has very limited exposure. Due to the 
increased variability in the presence of renewables, WAC operations become more important for 
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grid stability. Also, attacks on such applications are likely to have an immediate effect due to their 
high frequency of operation. The impact of attacks on frequency regulation can be aggravated by 
the presence of non-conventional sources. This reemphasizes the grave importance of this topic. 
This thesis emphasizes on the following needs: 
1. Modelling of power grid with renewables integrated with adequate accuracy. 
2. Development of alternate control algorithm from a cyber defense perspective. 
3. Attack and defense analysis on power system with various system conditions. 
Thesis Organization 
The main objectives of this thesis are to analyze the effect of cyber-attacks on a power grid 
with renewables integrated, and to provide an effective mitigation strategy against the attack. The 
organization of the thesis is as follows: 
1. Chapter 2 describes the attack on the AGC of the power system. It also introduces a PID 
based AGC algorithm and performs impact analysis on both the results. 
2. Chapter 3 presents a strategy for mitigation against the attack and analyses the performance 
and false alert property. 
3. Chapter 4 concludes the thesis and discusses scope for future study.  
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 ATTACK ANALYSIS 
Overview of AGC 
Automatic Generation Control (AGC) is a WAC operation used for secondary load 
frequency control of the power system after the primary control (i.e. governor action). The chief 
objectives of the operation are: 
1. Balance the net generation with the net load 
2. Maintain the frequency at set value (60 Hz or 50 Hz) 
3. Maintain the tie-line flows between the balancing authority areas (BA) 
 
Figure 2.1 Load balancing and frequency control (Figure from NERC) 
The target frequency bound in the North American grid varies with interconnection [6]. 
Eastern interconnection = 18 mHz 
Western interconnection = 22.8 mHz 
ERCOT interconnection = 30 mHz 
Quebec interconnection = 21 mHz 
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The algorithm uses instantaneous frequency and inter-area tie line flow values to calculate 
the Area Control Error (ACE) every 2 to 4 seconds. It ensures that each BA is responsible for its 
own load changes. In the conventional AGC operation, the ACE values are added up to generate 
the control input. 
ACE, 𝐸 = 𝛽. ∆𝑓 + ∑ ∆𝑃𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1      (2.1) 
where, 𝛽 – frequency bias factor 
∆𝑓 – frequency deviation 
∆𝑃𝑖 – ‘i
th’ tie line flow deviation 
Control input, 𝐶(𝑡) = ∑ 𝐸𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=0     (2.2) 
where, 𝐸𝑡 – ACE value at cycle ‘t’ 
Attacks on AGC 
Attacks on AGC can be classified based on different criteria. 
Based on the method, the attacks can be classified as: 
1. Replay attack – A copy of a previously observed packet is replayed to the target resulting 
in incorrect action. 
2. Denial of Service (DoS) – The communication is stopped by flooding the target with 
packets causing a channel overuse resulting in lack of operation. 
3. Data integrity attack – The values in the packet are modified by the attacker resulting in 
incorrect action. 
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4. Timing attack – The packet is captured by the attacker and released at a later instance 
resulting in incorrect action. 
Based on the template of the attack, the classification is as follows [10]: 
1. Scaling attack – A scaling parameter is used to modify the values. 
2. Ramp attack – A constant value is sent to the target continuously for several cycles. 
3. Pulse attack – The values are modified using temporally spaced short pulses with a fixed 
attack value. 
4. Random attack – Using values generated by a uniform random function, the packet values 
are modified. 
Based on the target, there are two types of attacks: 
1. Attack on sensor values 
2. Attack on ACE values 
This thesis analyses a ramp attack on the ACE values. 
Experimental Setup 
The analysis was conducted on an IEEE 39-bus model using RT-LAB and 
Matlab/Simulink as the editor. The system is divided into two BAs as shown in Figure 2.2. 
Generators 1 & 8, and 2 & 3 are involved in AGC operation in BA1 and BA2 respectively. 
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Figure 2.2 IEEE 39 bus model 
The model was modified to simulate renewable energy sources. Generators 4, 5 and 9 were 
converted to renewables successively for simulating increasing renewable penetration. For 
conversion to a renewable source (Figure 2.3), the single large machine was replaced by 100 
machines, each with a power rating of 1% of the original value & with an inertia of 0.1% of the 
single large machine. Each smaller machine was simulated with an input value subject to 1% 
fluctuation, to simulate the variation in the wind turbine output. 
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Figure 2.3 Generator conversion from conventional system to renewables 
Figure 2.4 shows the modelling of the experimental setup. The generator station 
(substation) consists of the power system model, that sends out the observed sensor values, and 
the block for calculating the control signal using the ACE values. The control center consists of 
the block involved in performing the AGC calculations and returning the ACE values to the 
generators. The attack takes place on the ACE values. 
 
Figure 2.4 Experimental setup layout 1 
Ramp Attack 
A ramp attack was conducted on the system. In this case, a constant ACE value was sent 
to the generator station for the attack duration, resulting in a constant increase or decrease of the 
generator output which leads to a constant raise or drop in system frequency (Figure 2.5). This 
action is performed by either a replay or data integrity attack. A significant drop in frequency 
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causes adverse frequency conditions leading to performance criteria violation, under-frequency 
load shedding, generation trip and loss of turbine life. 
Control signal after attack, 𝐶(𝑡 + 𝑡𝑎) = 𝐶(𝑡) + 𝐸𝑎 ∗ 𝑡𝑎  (2.3) 
where, 𝐸𝑎 – Attack magnitude 
𝑡𝑎 – No. of attack cycles 
𝐶(𝑡) – Control signal at the start of the attack 
 
Figure 2.5 Effect of ramp attack on frequency 
Case study with Conventional AGC 
The attack was conducted on two cases – attack on one ACE and two ACE values, for four 
different conditions of renewable penetration – 0%, 10%, 20% and 30%. The increase in renewable 
penetration has two consequences on the grid: 
1. Fluctuating output power leading to frequency fluctuations 
17 
 
2. Reduction in system inertia leading to faster frequency response and higher rate of change 
of frequency (ROCOF) 
The ACE value was attacked and replaced with -5 MW for a duration of 2 minutes (120 
seconds or 30 AGC cycles) causing a drop of 150 MW of generation. When both the ACE signals 
are attacked there is a drop of 300 MW. 
From the plots in Figure 2.6, it can be inferred that with increase in renewables, due to 
reduction of inertia, the ROCOF is higher and the frequency drop due to the attack is faster. 
 
Figure 2.6 Effect of ramp attack on conventional AGC for varying levels of renewable penetration 
To recover from the frequency drop, the grid responds by shedding some predetermined 
value of load (i.e. Under Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS)). This action is triggered at some value 
of frequency decided by the regulators. Typically, in the Eastern interconnection, the upper limit 
of this trigger point in 59.7 Hz [37]. Following this reduction in load, the frequency increases 
towards 60 Hz. Figure 2.7 depicts the effect of the ramp attack on one of the cases (viz. with 30% 
renewable penetration and attack on both ACE values) countered by UFLS. In this experiment the 
attack duration was for 3 minutes (45 AGC cycles). After 160 seconds, when the frequency reaches 
the under-frequency trigger point, 400 MW of load was shed to help recover the frequency. The 
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attack continued for another 20 seconds causing the frequency to reduce by 50 mHz. After the 
attack ended, AGC was restored and the frequency condition returned to normal. 
Currently, there are no measures established by regulators to help restore the frequency 
before UFLS occurs in the event of an attack. Thus, unless the operator manually takes an action 
such as load trips, using backup generators, etc., frequency recovery before 59.7 Hz is not possible. 
 
Figure 2.7 Effect of ramp attack countered by UFLS 
Impact of high renewable penetration 
From the above experiments, it was observed that increasing renewable shares may lead to 
higher impact during a cyber-attack. This raises concerns with respect to integrating more 
renewables. Due to reduction in inertia and increasing variability, any attack that causes a 
disturbance or change in system frequency is likely to have a faster impact. For example, a system 
with extremely high share of renewables might face an even faster drop in frequency during a ramp 
attack, and hence load shedding might be necessary sooner and/or even multiple times. Also, due 
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to higher variability with a high renewable presence, a simple DoS attack would be capable of 
destabilizing the system. One preventive measure is inertial emulation, using power electronic 
controllers to simulate inertial action similar to conventional generation. Another method is using 
superior governor control to reduce frequency fluctuations.  
One advantage with higher renewables is the faster frequency recovery due to any 
restoration techniques because of higher ROCOF. This can be observed from the plot in which the 
frequency recovery due to UFLS occurs within 3 seconds. 
PID Based AGC 
To help reduce the impact of the attack, a PID based control algorithm was developed. This 
involves modifying the control signal algorithm to help reduce the impact while retaining the AGC 
performance. 
Conventional AGC defines control signal, 
 𝐶(𝑡) = 𝐸0 + 𝐸1 + 𝐸2 + ⋯ + 𝐸𝑡 
This can be rearranged in a PID format as, 
𝐶(𝑡) = 1 ∗ 𝐸𝑡 + 1 ∗ (𝐸0 + 𝐸1 + ⋯ + 𝐸𝑡−1)   (2.4) 
where, 1 ∗ 𝐸𝑡 – represents the proportional component 
and, 1 ∗ (𝐸0 + 𝐸1 + ⋯ + 𝐸𝑡−1) – represents the integral component. 
By modifying the formula to include a derivative component and variable PID parameters, 
the control signal is derived as, 
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𝐶(𝑡) = 𝐾𝑃 ∗ 𝐸𝑡 + 𝐾𝐼 ∗ (𝐸0 + 𝐸1 + ⋯ + 𝐸𝑡−1) + 𝐾𝐷 ∗ (𝐸𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1) (2.5) 
PID parameter selection 
From equation 2.5, it can be inferred that changing the values of the PID parameters will 
vary the effect of the ramp attack. Thus, to reduce the effect, the parameters should have values 
lesser than 1. However, it is necessary to ensure that the AGC performance is not compromised. 
The values of the PID parameters are selected to help reduce the impact and maintain satisfactory 
performance. The best way to do this is to let KP remain as ‘1’ to ensure the most recent updates 
in the control are provided during that ACE value’s first cycle. A small value of around ‘0.01’ is 
assigned to KD to provide the derivative control action based on the rate of change of ACE. The 
main component that can help reduce the effect of attack is KI. Through a set of experiments, it 
was observed that the ideal value is around ‘0.5’ as it retains satisfactory load frequency control. 
This helps reduce the damage due to the ramping by approximately half. 
Case Study with PID Based AGC 
The same 8 experiments were repeated for the same attack duration and signal magnitude. 
But, due to the PID based AGC, by the end of 2 minutes the reduction in generation was only 77.5 
MW for attack on 1 ACE, and 155 MW for attack on 2 ACE values. The following observations 
were made: 
1. Attack on PID based AGC has lesser impact due to limiting the control signal which in 
turn limits generation drop (Figure 2.9). 
2. The plot on the left in Figure 2.8 shows that for attack signals of relatively lesser magnitude, 
with PID based AGC, the effect due to inertial loss is reduced, making the impact due to 
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change in renewables up to a certain level almost negligible. This is because, for small 
magnitude of attack there is marginal difference in time taken to attain the frequency level 
targeted by the generation change for the different conditions of renewable penetration. If 
the attack signals have a higher magnitude, an impact of similar nature but lesser in 
magnitude, is observed as shown in the plot on the right in Figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.8 Effect of ramp attack on PID based AGC for varying levels of renewable penetration 
 
Figure 2.9 Comparison of attack impacts 
The experimental results of the attack on the two AGC algorithms shown in Table 2.1 
support the conclusions derived in sections 2.5 & 2.7. 
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Table 2.1 Results of ramp attack 
% 
Renewable 
Penetration 
Frequency drop (Hz) 
Attack on 1 ACE Attack on 2 ACE 
Conventional 
AGC 
PID based AGC 
Conventional 
AGC 
PID based AGC 
Generation drop 
= 150 MW 
Generation drop 
= 77.5 MW 
Generation drop 
= 300 MW 
Generation drop 
=155 MW 
0 0.062 0.032 0.122 0.063 
10 0.072 0.033 0.143 0.073 
20 0.086 0.034 0.172 0.089 
30 0.106 0.048 0.214 0.11 
 
AGC performance evaluation 
The plots in Figure 2.10 show the AGC performance for both the algorithms under different 
conditions of renewables in the absence of an attack. The blue and green lines indicate the 
permissible upper limit (UL) and lower limit (LL) for frequency. It was observed that the PID 
based AGC algorithm provides a satisfactory performance that is as good as the conventional 
algorithm, since it manages to maintain the steady state frequency error within the regulation 
requirements (18 mHz in this case). 
 
Figure 2.10 AGC performance comparison 
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Conclusions 
The main conclusions obtained from the experiments were: 
1. With increase in renewable penetration, there is a reduction in system inertia and thus 
for the same attack vector, the change in frequency is faster. In this case, the ramp 
attack leads to a faster drop in frequency with increase in renewable content. 
2. PID based AGC that limits the control signals will suffer lesser impact due to an 
attack than conventional AGC, while maintaining satisfactory performance.  
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 MITIGATION ANALYSIS 
Mitigation Overview 
This chapter discusses a mitigation algorithm that can prevent the attack from affecting the 
system beyond certain limits. Since the thesis considers attack on the ACE signals, the mitigation 
algorithm is operated at the terminals of the generating station. Figure 3.1 shows the placement of 
the mitigation block in the experimental setup. The algorithm validates the ACE value that it 
receives using several conditions before allowing them through to the control signal calculator. 
 
Figure 3.1 Experimental setup layout 2 
The algorithm for mitigation is shown in the flowchart in Figure 3.2. After obtaining the 
ACE value, two conditions are checked: 
1. The values are checked to be within a pair of bounds. 
2. The sign of ACE is checked with the frequency value to ensure the ACE helps to improve 
frequency conditions, i.e. for a system frequency < 60 Hz, only a positive ACE value (ramp 
up signal) will be allowed, and vice-versa. 
If either condition is violated, the ACE value is dropped and replaced with 0. 
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Figure 3.2 Attack detection and mitigation procedure 
Assumptions 
This mitigation strategy assumes that the generating stations have access only to frequency 
values and thus cannot use tie-line flow values as a secondary parameter for ACE verification. 
Calculating the ACE bounds 
The bounds are determined using the data used by regulators for determining the 
performance parameters of the AGC (viz. Control Performance Standard - CPS1 and the Balancing 
Authority ACE Limits (BAAL)) [6]. The data consists of one-minute average values of frequency 
26 
 
and ACE for a total period of 12 months which are updated every month. These values also include 
readings obtained for system events such as contingencies, faults, etc. The bounds for each 
frequency range are the maximum and minimum ACE values observed for that range in the past 
12 months. Figure 3.3 describes the method for deriving the ACE bounds. 
 
Figure 3.3 Procedure to determine ACE bounds for mitigation 
Table 3.1 provides an example of how the ACE bounds are derived and updated. Let the 
frequency ranges be divided in blocks of 5 mHz. The bounds used during a month, say June, are 
obtained from the data of previous 12 months updated by the end of May (i.e. June of previous 
year to May of current year). While obtaining the bounds for July, the data is updated with the 
values obtained during the month of June, and the minimum and maximum values of ACE for 
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each frequency range is determined, and the respective bounds are updated with the new values. 
For example, since the ACE in the range 59.99-59.995 has a new minimum value of -32, the 
minimum ACE bound is updated with that value. Similar changes can be seen in other parts of the 
table. For the values that haven’t changed, it is assumed that the respective extreme values obtained 
from the data of June to May is the same as that obtained from July to June. 
Table 3.1 Monthly updating of ACE bounds 
Bounds for June Data obtained in June Bounds for July 
Frequency 
range (Hz) 
Min 
ACE 
Max 
ACE 
Frequency 
1-min avg 
ACE 1-
min avg 
Frequency 
range (Hz) 
Min 
ACE 
Max 
ACE 
59.98–59.985 -35 +50 59.994 -32 59.98–59.985 -35 +50 
59.985-59.99 -30 +45 60.004 -33 59.985-59.99 -30 +45 
59.99–59.995 -30 +40 60.004 -38 59.99–59.995 -32 +40 
59.995-60 -25 +35 60.009 +23 59.995-60 -27 +39 
60-60.005 -35 +20 59.998 -27 60-60.005 -38 +20 
60.005-60.01 -45 +20 59.996 +39 60.005-60.01 -45 +23 
60.01–60.015 -50 +25 59.997 +38 60.01–60.015 -50 +25 
60.015-60.02 -55 +30 60.007 -43 60.015-60.02 -55 +30 
 
Case Study 
The ramp attack was conducted with the mitigation algorithm in place for both the AGC 
methods, with varying conditions of renewables, and with attacks on single and multiple ACE 
values. The magnitude and duration of the attack were the same as in sections 2.5 & 2.7. The plots 
in Figure 3.4 show the result of the attack with mitigation in place for the four cases of attack and 
AGC. The following observations were made: 
1. The attack was prevented during the AGC cycles for which condition 2 wasn’t satisfied. 
Condition 1 wasn’t violated as the attack magnitude was small. This resulted in the 
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possibility of the attack being rarely successful and the successful ones having negligible 
impact. 
2. The impact would be lesser when the mitigation was used with the PID based AGC, as this 
method reduces the effect of the previous ACE values (or attack signals) on the control 
signals. 
3. Although the ramp attack was mitigated, due to the absence of AGC function during attack, 
the frequency regulation is essentially lost. This can lead to adverse frequency conditions 
during extreme load and renewable generation variations when faced with an attack. 
 
Figure 3.4 Effect of ramp attack with mitigation 
Overall, the attack was successfully mitigated, and system frequency contained within the 
necessary limits for a majority of the attack duration. 
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Effect of mitigation on AGC performance 
From the algorithm, it is evident that an alert would be generated whenever the ACE signals 
have opposite signs. This will result in a high incidence of false positives as this condition in ACE 
is observed most of the time. So, it is important to ensure that the normal AGC operation isn’t 
adversely affected by the mitigation. 
The AGC operation was simulated with the mitigation in place for both AGC algorithms 
and different conditions of renewables. Due to frequency being the primary factor in the algorithm, 
the system tends to restore frequency without any hindrance, despite the false positives. The plots 
in Figure 3.5 show that the AGC operations exhibit satisfactory performance with the mitigation 
installed for the simulated system conditions. 
 
Figure 3.5 Effect of mitigation on AGC performance 
An analysis of the performance of tie-line flow restoration was conducted by means of a 
step change in two of the loads. One load in BA1 and one in BA2 were subject to an increase and 
decrease of 50 MW of load respectively as shown in Figure 3.6. This was done to achieve an 
extreme condition of around 60 Hz, but with the maximum possible tie-line flow deviation for a 
given load change. This is because both the BAs would have ACE values similar in magnitude but 
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with opposite signs, i.e. both BAs need to achieve a ramp up and ramp down in their generation 
by an equal amount, while being allowed to do only one at a time and needing longer time for 
restoration. It was observed that the system performance was satisfactory with the mitigation 
algorithm in place. The plot on the left in Figure 3.7 shows the frequency restoration. Even though 
the frequency performance appears to be inferior, there is a very less possibility of violation. This 
seemingly inferior performance is because at any instant, the machines in the grid are allowed to 
either ramp up or down, but not both. However, because of condition 2 in the mitigation algorithm 
the frequency deviation in any direction will always be facing an aggressive opposition. This 
would cause relatively greater frequency swings as compared to the system without mitigation. 
From the plot on the right, it was observed that the tie line restoration occurs at fairly the same 
duration with or without mitigation. 
 
Figure 3.6 IEEE 39 bus model – AGC analysis with mitigation 
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Figure 3.7 Effect of mitigation on frequency and tie line restoration 
Effect of mitigation on contingency response 
Current NERC regulations defined by BAL-002 standards, require the grid to restore its 
ACE to zero or a pre-disturbance value within 15 minutes following any disturbance [38]. This 
basically means that the grid is required to restore normal operation within 15 minutes following 
any event. During such situations, the ACE values could possibly be higher than those observed 
during normal operation. This operation might be at a risk if the mitigation algorithm is used as 
condition 1 limits the ACE to bounds based on values that were previously observed. Thus, it is 
necessary to analyze the impact of the mitigation on contingency restoration. Since, it is required 
by each BA to maintain sufficient reserves to address at least the Most Severe Single Contingency 
(MSSC) in its own area, the availability of resources to handle the event is not a concern. Rather, 
the issue lies in the mitigation’s handling of higher ACE values and the effect of condition 1. 
For the analysis, three types of contingencies have been considered as shown in Figure 3.8. 
From [38], it was found that on an average more than 100 events have occurred from 2010 to 2014 
in the Eastern interconnection alone. So, in our analysis, we assume that the data used for 
generating the ACE bounds contain values observed during a contingency. 
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Figure 3.8 IEEE 39 bus model – Contingency analysis with mitigation 
Contingency on a non-critical line 
A non-critical line is one which when subject to an event doesn’t cause any observable 
drop in load or generation. For such scenarios, the ACE values aren’t expected to be very high. A 
contingency was simulated by disconnecting the line indicated in Figure 3.8, and the system 
response for restoring the normal operation of the grid was observed. The experiment was 
conducted for the system with and without the mitigation algorithm. Figure 3.9 shows the plots 
that depict the performance of the grid during the above-mentioned scenarios. Going with the 
assumption that the algorithm considers data due to events, it was observed that for simple 
contingencies such as the one on a non-critical line, presence of the mitigation doesn’t impact the 
contingency recovery as shown in plot. 
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Figure 3.9 Contingency analysis on a non-critical line 
Contingency on a tie-line 
The second analysis was a contingency on one of the tie-lines indicated in Figure 3.8. In 
such situations, a significant tie-line error and hence a higher ACE value can be expected. The 
analysis was conducted on two cases – system that has a history of such a contingency in the past 
12 months (i.e. the data used to generate the ACE bounds contained values due to such a 
contingency), and a system without history of such an event. In the second case, we assume history 
of a simple contingency.  The contingency on the tie-line was simulated on both the cases with 
and without mitigation. 
The performance of the system is shown in the plots in Figures 3.10 and 3.11. From the 
plots, it was observed that the presence of the mitigation algorithm doesn’t impact the contingency 
response of the grid for the considered tie-line loss, regardless of history of contingencies. This 
can be due to the fact that for the contingency considered, there wasn’t any significant drop in 
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generation or load. Although with history of a tie-line contingency, the frequency deviation was 
lesser, the steady state conditions were achieved at fairly the same duration. 
 
Figure 3.10 Contingency analysis on a tie-line without history 
 
Figure 3.11 Contingency analysis on a tie-line with history 
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Most Severe Single Contingency 
The final analysis was performed for the Most Severe Single Contingency (MSSC) of the 
system. Such a contingency would cause the maximum possible impact on the system due to a 
single event. From Figure 3.8, it can be seen that the loss of the indicated line would disconnect 
Generators 4 and 5 causing a severe drop in system generation and hence frequency. Such a 
situation would require extremely high values of ACE, which are rarely observed, to restore 
normal operation. The analysis was conducted for the system with and without mitigation, and 
with and without history of the considered contingency (assuming history of simple 
contingencies). 
 
Figure 3.12 Analysis of MSSC without history 
From the plots in Figures 3.12 and 3.13, it was observed that for a system without history, 
it is not possible to respond to an MSSC. This is obviously because of the high ACE values 
required for restoration, which aren’t normally observed during simple contingencies. If a system 
has history of a MSSC, recovery is possible within the required duration as shown in Figure 3.13. 
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Figure 3.13 Analysis of MSSC with history 
Conclusions 
The designed mitigation strategy helps avoid the large drop in frequency due to attacks and 
to some extent mitigates the attack. But, due to absence of AGC, the load frequency control is lost. 
From the false positive analysis for the mitigation, it was observed that the AGC performance was 
not adversely affected for the tested system conditions. An analysis was also performed on the 
impact of mitigation on the contingency restoration, and it was observed that for contingencies 
that do not cause a significant change in generation or load, the response wasn’t affected. Also, for 
contingencies that do cause such a change, the response wasn’t affected provided the system has 
a history of similar contingencies in the past 12 months. 
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 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Conclusion 
With the electric power grid advancing towards a greener, reliable and smarter future, the 
importance of cyber security is of paramount importance. With increasing dependence on critical 
applications, such as WAMPAC, using sophisticated state-of-the-art equipment like 
synchrophasors over the Wide Area Network (WAN), there is an ever-increasing need for research 
in the various cyber threats that can pose a risk to the critical infrastructure. Also, as the nature of 
the grid changes with more renewable sources, distributed generation, electric vehicles, etc. it is 
essential to conduct studies using more realistic and practical power grid simulations. 
To address some of the issues faced, this thesis makes two contributions. 
1. First, an analysis was conducted on cyber-attacks on the power grid with renewables 
integrated. A ramp attack was carried out on the AGC operation under different conditions 
and the ill-effects that increasing renewable penetration posed in the face of an attack were 
observed. An alternative algorithm employing a PID based approach, with the aim of 
diminishing the impact of cyber-attacks was introduced, and its performance analyzed 
under different scenarios. A faster drop in frequency was observed with increase in 
renewable penetration level. 
2. Secondly, a two-step mitigation strategy was developed and validated in terms of defense 
effectiveness and efficiency of system operation. Although the load frequency control was 
suspended for the duration of the attack, the damage caused by the attack in the previous 
case was greatly avoided. An analysis on the effect of false positives generated by the 
mitigation on the AGC performance was conducted, and satisfactory performance was 
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observed. An analysis of the effect on contingency response was also performed, and it 
was observed that, for contingencies resulting in a significant drop in load and/or 
generation, the response was poor unless the system had experienced similar event during 
the previous 12 months. Satisfactory response was observed for events that were less 
damaging. 
Future Work 
Further development on this topic would include: 
1. Analysis of various developments for renewables, like battery storage integration, 
distributed generation, AGC participation by wind turbines, inertial emulation, 
renewable dispatch, etc. will be helpful in generating more cutting-edge results in the 
area. Inclusion of such technology will influence the performance of the renewables 
integrated system and might result in reducing some of the adverse impacts of 
renewable integration. As a result, the conclusions obtained from this thesis might be 
exaggerated for such a grid. 
2. Development and analysis of new types of attacks on renewables and related features 
such as the ones mentioned above. An intelligent attacker might opt for a more stealthy 
and coordinated attack, which while having negligible immediate impact might result 
in severe long-term consequences. Also, while considering the technological advances 
as mentioned in the first point, it is important to realize the probable increase in attack 
surface which opens further options for the attacker. Thus, a scrutinizing analysis of 
the vulnerability and impact evaluation of a more modern power grid is of tremendous 
importance. 
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3. Improvement of mitigation algorithm to a resilient algorithm that can help the system 
to correct its frequency deviations, using data from forecast, governor response data, 
peer-to-peer interaction, etc. is an absolute necessity. As seen from the results, the 
mitigation algorithm, while capable of reducing the impact in the event of an attack, 
completely neglects the load frequency control (LFC) action needed for system 
stability. Also, from the contingency analysis, it was observed that the system tends to 
have an inferior performance while responding to contingencies resulting in a 
significant generation loss. In these cases, additional information obtained from real 
time load forecast, weather patterns, and other system data can assist the mitigation 
algorithm in performing effective LFC. These data when combined with state-of-the-
art applications such as machine learning, can help in predicting accurate control and 
protective actions.
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